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Abstract
Strict finitism is the position that only those natural numbers
exist that we can represent in practice. Michael Dummett, in a
paper called Wang’s Paradox, famously tried to show that strict
finitism is an incoherent position. By using the Sorites paradox,
he claimed that certain predicates the strict finitist is committed
to are incoherent. More recently, Ofra Magidor objected to
Dummett’s claims, arguing that Dummett fails to show the
incoherence of strict finitism. In this paper, I shall investigate
whether Magidor is successful in preventing Dummett from
proving the incoherence of strict finitism. Though not all the
counterarguments Magidor presents are successful, she does in the
end manage to corner Dummett. There remains an opportunity
for Dummett to insist on the incoherence of strict finitism, but
this is a very small opening. The final conclusion of this paper
is that Dummett cannot logically prove the incoherence of strict
finitism, even though a limited chance for success remains.
Keywords: Strict finitism, Dummett, Magidor, Sorites Para-
dox
In 1975, Michael Dummett wrote a paper called Wang’s Paradox. In
this paper, he used Wang’s paradox, a variation on the Sorites paradox,
to show that strict finitism is incoherent. Strict finitism is a rather
peculiar constructivist view of mathematics. It maintains that only those
numbers that can be represented in practice actually exist [1, pp. 302-
303]. Strict finitism also holds that only proofs with a number of steps
that can be checked are legitimate. Numbers which are equal to a number
of steps in a proof that can be checked are called apodictic numbers. Ten
and one hundred are apodictic, since proofs with ten or one hundred steps
can be checked in practice. Googol (10100) is not apodictic because a
proof with googol steps cannot be checked in practice [3, pp. 472-473].
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Dummett’s claim that strict finitism is incoherent has been contested
by Ofra Magidor. She has developed two strategies to undermine Dum-
mett’s argument [2, p. 404]. The goal of the current essay is to discover
whether Magidor succeeded. I shall argue that, in the end, she indeed
prevents Dummett from proving the incoherence of strict finitism. Dum-
mett will not be completely defeated however. He still has some space
left to insist on the incoherence of strict finitism, but Magidor does show
that his chances are bleak.
We can only properly understand Magidor’s objections if we under-
stand Dummett’s original arguments against strict finitism. To foster
this understanding is the task of the first part of this essay. In a nutshell,
Dummett shows that certain predicates the strict finitist is committed
to are incoherent. Thus, strict finitism as a position is unviable.
The incoherent predicate that the strict finitist is committed to can
either be ‘natural number’ or ‘apodictic’. Part two shows that we can
easily dismiss Dummett if the predicate that is attacked is ‘natural num-
ber’. Parts three and four deal with the coherence of the predicate ‘apo-
dictic number’. It is in these parts that we encounter Magidor’s attempt
to dismantle Dummett’s argumentation. Part three shows that Magi-
dor’s first counterargument against Dummett fails. However, in part
four Magidor achieves her goal for the most part. It turns out that
Dummett cannot after all prove the incoherence of strict finitism. Dum-
mett could make a final effort to show that he is right by referring to
certain empirical research we could do. However, this only works if the
research is actually done and turns out favourable for Dummett. It is not
very likely that this will occur, but Magidor did technically not succeed
in completely disarming Dummett.
1 Dummett’s argumentation
As said, Wang’s paradox forms the basis for Dummett’s attack against
strict finitism. His formulation of the paradox is as follows:
‘’0 is small;
If n is small, n+1 is small:
Therefore, every number is small. ‘’ [1, p. 303]
The idea here is quite simple and familiar to anybody acquainted
with the Sorites paradox. There are some numbers that are small, with
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zero being an obvious example. Now, it seems equally obvious that a
difference of one does not really matter for smallness. If we take any
small number, and we add 1 to this number, then the result is still a
small number.
The problem is that these two premises can be used to reach an
absurd conclusion. 0+1 equals 1, so we must accept 1 as a small number.
This holds on the basis of step 2 of the paradox, which states that a
difference of 1 does not matter for smallness. 1+1=2 and 2 is therefore
also small. The same strategy is applied to show the smallness of 3, 4, 5,
et cetera. This chain can go on for ever, which shows us that all natural
numbers are small. This conclusion is unacceptable. Certain numbers,
such as 27 billion or googol, are clearly not small. We are in a situation
where we believe that googol is not small, but the two premises, both of
which we are inclined to believe, show that googol is small. A paradox
has been reached [1, pp. 303-305].
The relationship between Wang’s paradox and strict finitism is that
Dummett holds that strict finitism runs into this paradox. Strict finitism
is committed to certain predicates that have the same problem as ‘small-
ness’ [2, pp. 403-405]. There are multiple candidates for the problematic
predicate. One option is that the paradox holds for the predicate ‘nat-
ural number’ as interpreted by the strict finitist.1 For the strict finitist,
the predicate ‘natural number’ and ‘number that can be represented in
practice’ range over the exact same number of numbers. Magidor fo-
cuses on the predicate ‘apodictic’ [2, pp. 404-405]. For the majority of
this paper, I will follow Magidor and critically examine the coherence
of the predicate ‘apodictic’. Natural numbers will be discussed in the
next section and then abandoned. Regardless of what specific predicate
we have in mind, the important thing to note is that Dummett believes
that some predicate the strict finitist is committed to is paradoxical.
The task ahead for Magidor is to prevent Dummett from reaching this
conclusion.
2 Natural numbers
Before I turn to natural numbers, I will say some more on Wang’s para-
dox. What feature of predicates like ‘small’, ‘apodictic’ or ‘natural num-
ber’ causes the paradox? The problem is that the sets that form the
extensions of these predicates are both weakly infinite and weakly finite.
A set is weakly infinite if there is some well-ordering of the set which
has no last member. A set is weakly finite when, for some finite ordinal
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number n, there is no nth member of the set [1, p. 312]. Wang’s paradox
is exploiting this combination of features. The second step of the para-
dox is based on weak infinity. If we say about some small number that
it holds that one of its neighbours is not small, then that number is the
last member. Since there is no last member, we can never claim, for any
number x that is next to a small number, that x is not small. But weak
finity ensures that there are some numbers that are not small. Thus,
the combination of weak finity and weak infinity causes the paradox [2,
pp.403-408].
The strange thing about the predicate ‘natural number’ as inter-
preted by the strict finitist is that the weak finity of its extension is not
problematic in the way described above. The reason for this is fairly
simple. For smallness, the paradox only works because there are some
numbers that are not small, like googol or 27 billion. This fails for nat-
ural numbers since there are no natural numbers that are not natural
numbers! Let us spell this out explicitly. Note here that ‘being a number
that can be represented in practice’ is the same as ‘natural number’.
0 can be represented in practice;
If n can be represented in practice, then n+1 can be represented
in practice:
All natural numbers can be represented in practice.2
To arrive at the paradox, we need to claim that there are natural
numbers that cannot be represented. However, according to the strict
finitist, no such numbers exist. That is exactly the fundamental premise
of her position! The strict finitist would simply accept the conclusion
of the above proof. So, if Dummett is trying to claim that it is the
predicate ‘natural number’ or the predicate ‘being a number that can be
represented in practice’ that is causing paradoxes for the strict finitist,
then his claim fails. There is simply no way to make the predicate
‘natural number’ paradoxical.3 If Dummett is to show that strict finitism
is committed to paradoxical predicates, then his only hope is that the
predicate ‘apodictic’ turns out to be paradoxical.
3 The weak infinity of apodictic numbers
We have seen that the natural number approach goes awry because the
set of all natural numbers is not weakly finite. Attempting to do the
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same for apodicticness is not an option. For example, googol can be
represented in practice.4 And yet, it is impossible to check a proof
that has googol steps in practice. But if we follow the paradox, we are
forced to state that googol is apodictic. It seems that the extension of
‘apodicitc’ is straightforwardly weakly finite in a problematic way. For
the predicate ‘apodictic’, the solution must come by contesting the weak
infinity claim.
For the weak infinity claim, it is essential that there is no clear border
between apodictic and non-apodictic numbers. By a border I mean a
number which is not apodictic, but whose predecessor is apodictic. An
opponent of Dummett can only prove that the set of apodictic numbers
is not weakly infinite if she can prove that such a border indeed exists.
This is so because precisely the discovery of a border proves that it does
not follow from the fact that n is apodictic, that n+1 is apodictic as
well. Note that it is not necessary to find the specific number that is
the border. Opponents of Dummett only need to prove that there is a
border, wherever it may be.
According to Magidor, such a border exists. She thinks that the case
of apodictic numbers is akin to that of tipping the balance of a scale
by adding small bits of grain to one side. Adding one bit of grain does
not change much, but there is some definite point where the balance is
tipped. Thus, there is a clear border between the amount of grain that
tips the scale and the amount that does not tip the scale [2, pp. 404-406].
The reason Magidor thinks that this analogy works is because math-
ematicians cannot keep checking steps for an eternity. At some point,
they physically collapse. It is not easy to discover this upper limit, but it
does exist. Thus, Magidor thinks that she has shown that the extension
of the predicate ‘apodictic’ yields a weakly infinite set [2, pp. 404-406].5
One might wonder how relevant this physical endpoint is for the
discovery of an appropriate border between apodictic and non-apodictic
numbers. If Magidor is merely saying that certain numbers are not
apodictic because the mathematician will collapse at some point, then we
did not learn anything new. It was already accepted that some numbers
are not apodictic. This did not stop Dummett from claiming that the
extension of ‘apodictic’ forms a weakly infinite set before and it will
not do so now either. We do not need to show that some numbers are
not apodictic, we need to show that there is a definite border between
apodictic and non-apodictic numbers. That is, we need a number that
is not apodictic, but whose predecessor is apodictic. Magidor has not
shown that the number of steps checked that was reached right before
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collapse is apodictic. If this cannot be shown, then the empirical fact
that physical collapse at some point occurs is not interesting.
In other words, Magidor must claim that the set of apodictic numbers
equals the set of numbers of steps that can be checked before collapse.
This comes down to translating, ‘can be checked in practice’ as ‘can
be checked before physical collapse’. It can be fairly objected that this
seems a highly arbitrary translation. Presumably, the strict finitist is
aiming at current practices within mathematics. And in that context,
it simply does not happen that people work on one and only one proof
until they physically collapse. Normally, mathematicians stop checking
a proof long before that point. This means that the border for apodictic
numbers, if there is one, is much lower than what Magidor suggests.
It is also possible to argue for a much higher border for apodictic
and non-apodictic numbers. If we are already going as far as to presume
that working until collapse counts as a fair border, then why not go
even further? What if we allow multiple mathematicians to check the
same proof? Then we no longer depend on the physique, or lifespan, of
one person. Perhaps certain technologies could be developed to make
checking proofs go smoother. In principle, we could go on checking a
proof for as long as humanity exists. If we are willing to admit that this
is possible, and it does seem logically and physically possible, then there
is no straightforward reason why we should not consider these extreme
conditions as the proper border for apodictic and non-apodictic numbers.
The consequence would be that the border lies between two incredibly
high numbers. Numbers like one million would probably be apodictic if
we allow for multiple generations of checking mathematicians.
The point of the above exercise was not to show what insanely high
number of checked steps we could reach if we wanted to. Nor am I trying
to prove that we can translate the term ‘apodictic’ in many ways. The
point is that all of the translations above, including the one by Magidor,
are arbitrary. Apodicticness is a complicated notion that cannot be
captured by the simple translations above. There is no reason to accept
any of them as an acceptable rendition of what it is to be apodictic.
If Magidor wants to endorse her translation a correct one, she should
argue for it. As far as I am aware, she does not do so. The result is
that no strict border between apodictic and non-apodictic numbers has
been found. The translation Magidor suggested was supposed to ensure
that the number that comes right before physical collapse is apodictic.
With the translation rejected as arbitrary, it might very well be that this
supposedly last member of the set of apodictic numbers is not apodictic
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at all! The idea that for any apodictic number n, n+1 is apodictic as
well is not refuted.
Magidor has failed to show that there is a non-arbitrary border be-
tween apodictic and non-apodictic numbers. Of course, we could assign
some more or less random border if we wanted to. This is uncontro-
versial, since this can be done for any vague predicate. We can assign
random boundaries for predicates like ‘red’, ‘small’, ‘trustworthy’. It is
equally uncontroversial that this is not an acceptable solution.6 Such
borders often do not represent what we normally mean when talking
about such predicates. So, unless Magidor gives some convincing reason
why physical collapse should be the border, we can maintain that the
predicate ‘apodictic’ remains vague. Magidor’s argument is not sufficient
to prevent Dummett from insisting that the extension of the predicate
‘apodictic’ is weakly infinite.
Of course, all of the above should not be taken as proof of the vague-
ness of the term ‘apodictic’. I only showed that Magidor’s attempt to
prove the opposite fails. She could not refute the weak infinity of the
extension of the predicate ’apodictic’, so Dummett is allowed enough
space to claim it is weakly infinite. I did not here attempt to show that
Dummett is correct in claiming this. Instead, I limited myself to show-
ing that Magidor’s counterattack fails. She did not manage to reach
the negative result she sought, so I consider her first attempt to defeat
Dummett a failure.
4 Preventing the paradox
It does not seem possible to prevent the set of numbers that is the
extension of the predicate ‘apodictic’ from being both weakly infinite
and weakly finite. Dummett is right that the strict finitist is committed
to predicates which trigger the paradox. The only way out available to
Magidor is to prevent Dummett from using weak infinity and weak finity
to reach a contradiction. Should she fail in doing so, then we are forced
to conclude that strict finitism is not a viable position.
As Magidor points out, and Dummett is aware of, it is actually not
so easy to prove that the paradox holds. The most poignant problem
is with the step from premise 2 to the conclusion. If we know that 0 is
apodictic and that if n is apodictic, that n+1 is also apodictic, how can
we then know that all numbers are apodictic? This last step requires
induction, a principle the strict finitist tends to reject. Strict finitists,
typically being constructivists about mathematics, do not like this type
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of automatic reasoning. They demand that every step is spelled out and
checked. [2, pp. 406-407].
Dummett retorts that induction is not needed as a principle. We
could do the reasoning by hand. First, we show that 1 is apodictic. After
all, 0 is apodictic and if n is apodictic, then n+1 is as well. Now we go
on to show that 2 is apodictic, 3 is, 4 is, et cetera. We will eventually
reach a number that we normally hold to be non-apodictic, despite the
considerable number of steps this will take. The paradox holds without
induction [1, pp. 304-306].
Magidor, in response, points out that the strict finitist will block
this move. Each individual step is probably acceptable, but the proof
as a whole is not. Before the proof can be acceptable, each step needs
to be checked. For the most obvious non-apodictic numbers, such as
googol and 27 billion, this is not possible. We cannot check a googol
steps in practice. Thus, the strict finitist is likely to reject the step by
step approach, simply because there are too many steps involved [2, pp.
406-408].
Dummett is still not defeated. He suggests that we take some number
m that is obviously not apodictic. We also take a number n that is
apodictic. The final number we introduce is a constant, k. The claim
by Dummett is that for some possible interpretations of m, n, and k, a
contradiction can be reached. The slightly informal proof for this goes as
follows: Take some non-apodictic number m for which it holds that if we
subtract the constant k, we get an apodictic number. At the same time,
for some apodictic number n, it holds that n + k yields an apodictic
number. Note that this second premise requires that constant k is an
apodictic number as well. Given the weak infinity of the set of apodictic
numbers, if n + k is apodictic, then n + 1 + k is also apodictic. Next,
we can prove that n + 2 + k is apodictic. In this manner, we can keep
on increasing the size of the number next to n. At some point, n plus
this number becomes equivalent to m−k. This number is, given the
presumption we started with, apodictic. In other words, we can prove
that m− k + k is apodictic. This is the same thing as saying that m is
apodictic. This result contradicts our starting presumption that m is not
apodictic. So, given the premises of Wang’s paradox and the existence
of some appropriate n, m, and k, we can derive a contradiction without
using a proof that has too many steps to check [1, 306-308].
Magidor responds by doubting the existence of some appropriate n,
m and k. Dummett should provide concrete suggestions for the values
of n, m and k. The easiest one to fill in is n, since any apodictic number
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will do. Zero or ten would both be fine candidates. It is more difficult
to find concrete numbers for k and m. It is important to note that the
strict finitist will only accept concrete numbers for k and m. Again,
this is because of the constructivist background of strict finitism [2, pp.
407-410].
What Dummett needs is essentially this:
‘’There is a number k and a number M , such that M is not
apodictic, k is apodictic, and M−k is apodictic.” [2, p. 408]
There is a way to show that m and k indeed exist.7 Take any apo-
dictic number as our starting number. Let us call this starting number
p. Next, double the starting number. The result is then 2p. Is 2p apo-
dictic or not? If we say that 2p is apodictic as well, then all is well for
the moment. However, if we say that 2p is not apodictic, then we have
reached a contradiction. After all, because of the weak infinity of the
set containing all apodictic numbers, we can prove that 2p should be
apodictic. It is given that if n is apodictic, then n + 1 is also apodictic.
If we fill in p for n, we can prove that p+ 1, p+ 2, p+ 3 and so on are all
apodictic. After some time, we reach the point where we can claim that
p + p is apodictic. It would take exactly p steps to prove this. This is a
number of steps that should be allowed by strict finitist. We established
at the beginning that p is an apodictic number, so a proof containing p
steps is acceptable. Thus, we are forced to say that 2p is apodictic.
When it has been established that 2p must be apodictic, we can
repeat our trick. If we accept that 2p is apodictic, we can show that 4p
must be apodictic as well. If the strict finitist wants to deny this, we can
simply present a proof with 2p steps that shows that 4p is apodictic. A
proof with 2p steps must be accepted, since 2p is an apodictic number.
The strict finitist is now forced to acknowledge 4p as an apodictic number
as well.
With this method in hand, we can continue on to prove the apodic-
ticness of 8p, 16p, 32p, 64p and so on. If we insert 2 as our p, then we
reach 2100 after a mere 100 repeats. Surely, the result that 2100 is apo-
dictic is enough to show that the predicate cannot fulfil the role strict
finitists imagine for it.
As Magidor convincingly shows, the problem with the above is that
it presumes that all numbers are either apodictic or not. For more clas-
sically inclined mathematicians, this makes a lot of sense. With the law
of the excluded middle in the back of their minds, classical mathemati-
cians would defend the idea that for any number x, ‘x is apodictic’ is
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either true or false. However, the strict finitist is likely to deny this.
Most strict finitist are constructivists and tend to deny the law of the
excluded middle. Thus, they would see no reason to play along with
the strategy I explained above. When asked whether 2p is apodictic or
not, they would simply reply that they do not know. They would not
consider themselves to be in the right position to judge whether 2p is
apodictic. With the law of the excluded middle out of the way, there
indeed seems to be some space to neither claim that 2p is apodictic nor
to claim that 2p is not apodictic. With the apodicticness of 2p having
become uncertain, we can no longer go on to prove that 4p is apodic-
tic. Thus, our trick for showing in 100 steps that, for example, 2100 is
apodictic, is not going to work. Instead, we are again forced to look for
concrete candidates for m and k [2, pp. 409-410].8
It does not seem prima facie likely that there are candidates available
that are obviously correct. The vagueness of the predicate ‘apodictic’ is
such that we cannot distinguish good examples from bad ones. We need
to define ‘apodictic’ more sharply if we are to succeed. Of course, if this
is attempted, then one should watch out not to create a sharp boundary
between apodictic and non-apodictic numbers. Otherwise, the extension
of the predicate ‘apodictic’ will no longer be weakly infinite. We have
seen in section three that if that is allowed, then Wang’s paradox will
not trigger. This would make strict finitism a viable position.
Thus, the new definition of ‘apodictic’ has two hard to combine tasks.
There must be no sharp boundary, and yet the definition must be sharp
enough for us to find appropriate candidates for k and m. The difficulty
of non-arbitrarily doing so is considerable.9 We saw in the last section
that Magidor was not able to change the definition of ‘apodictic’ in her
favour. It seems to me that Dummett has a better chance though. He
does not need to find any precise border like Magidor. Magidor had
to essentially dissolve the vagueness of the term ‘apodictic’, whereas
Dummett only needs to limit this vagueness somewhat or at least map
it our more precisely.
I suggest that the best way for Dummett to do this would be empirical
research. It can be researched what number of steps within a proof most
mathematicians would find acceptable to actually check by hand. All
numbers for which this holds are apodictic in a fairly uncontroversial
manner. Next, with Magidor’s first tactic against Dummett in mind,
we could investigate at what point mathematicians start to physically
collapse. Let us say, for the sake of the argument, that we limit the
amount of time to just 24 hours. It could be that if we double the number
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of acceptable steps to check in one day, we would reach a number at which
most mathematicians would collapse. It can be argued that the number
at which collapse occurs is not apodictic, even if it is not a border.
If we could successfully show this, then we would have some plausible
candidates for k and m. k would be the highest number acceptable to
mathematicians and m would be the number of mass physical collapse.
Also, m would equal or be less than 2k.
Technically speaking, such a feat is not impossible. Or if this par-
ticular 24-hour set-up fails, we could try do devise other experiments.
Perhaps if we take a years’ time, it could be that the collapse-number
is either equal or less than twice the acceptable-number. The point is
that any research will do that would yield an uncontroversial apodictic
number x and an uncontroversial non-apodictic number y for which it
holds that y is equal to or less than 2x.
In this way, a small opening has formed for Dummett. If the required
research can be pulled off, he would have the required concrete numbers
for k and m. Still, this opening is of limited value. The first problem
is that as long as the research has not been done, it provides nothing
more than a promissory note. The incoherence of strict finitism can only
be shown if the research has been done and has proven favourable for
Dummett. Until such times, the strict finitist is not refuted.
A more serious threat to Dummett is that the research might very
well yield a dead end for him. Sustained empirical investigations could
simply show that there are no cases that provide acceptable k’s and
m’s. The difficulty of thinking of intuitively plausible cases is already
an early bad sign. On the top of our heads, we cannot think of a good
case. Further research might show that this is caused by the fact that no
good cases exist. At the very least, good cases have proven hard to find
so far. If Dummett were to bet on these empirical experiments, then he
would essentially be relying on luck. Unless he actually does perform
experiments and then proceeds to get lucky, the strict finitist need not
worry.
All in all, Dummett does have some space left to argue for the inco-
herence of strict finitism. But he has to rely on empirical experiments.
Given the fact that success has evaded us so far, Dummett should con-
sider himself very lucky if he does succeed to find a case that can provide
him with what he needs. The position of the strict finitist is thus signifi-
cantly more secure than that of Dummett, but Dummett, pace Magidor,
still has a slight fighting chance.
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5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to assess the struggle between Michael Dum-
mett and Ofra Magidor concerning the incoherence of strict finitism. At
the centre was Dummett’s argument, that was based on Wang’s para-
dox. This argument shows that the term ‘apodictic’, which is a term the
strict finitist is committed to, leads to contradiction. This argument by
Dummett relies on the vagueness of the term ‘apodictic’. Therefore, if
the vagueness of the predicate ‘apodictic’ could be removed, then Dum-
mett’s argument would collapse. Magidor attempted this by arguing that
there is a strict border between apodictic and non-apodictic numbers by
pointing to the physical collapse of mathematicians. However, this move
just comes down to translating ‘apodictic’ as ‘can be checked before col-
lapse’. This translation was rejected as arbitrary, thereby terminating
Magidor’s first attempt to refute Dummett’s argument.
Magidor’s second attempt to curb Dummett’s argument fared better.
Strict finitism, given its radical constructivist views, does not allow for
much in terms of proofs. There are multiple perfectly fine classical proofs
that Dummett can produce to prove the incoherence of strict finitism.
Magidor successfully shows that the strict finitist rejects all of them on
principal grounds. It is exactly its strictness that saves strict finitism.
This strictness also, partially, shows why the view is not very popular.
The incredibly small room for movement causes immediate feelings of
claustrophobia. We would appreciate it if our logic could do more than
strict finitism can deliver.10 Still, Magidor uses these limits in an inge-
nious way, with the result that Dummett cannot prove the incoherence
of strict finitism with exclusively logical means.
The only way out for Dummett is aid from empirical research. Dum-
mett needs to find some apodictic number k for which it holds that 2k
is not apodictic. If Dummett is extremely lucky, such a case might be
found if we investigate the mathematicians at work. However, until such
research has been done, this is no more than a promissory note. It is
therefore fair to say that Magidor has prevented Dummett from proving
the incoherence of strict finitism. Still, Magidor did not succeed in com-
pletely defeating Dummett. It is not likely that the last opening that
remains to him will result in victory, but it is an opening nonetheless.
Contrary to Magidor’s claims, Dummett still has a fighting chance.
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Notes
1 This possibility has been pursued by Crispin Wright, though he looked at integers
[8].
2 This presumably also holds for non-natural numbers.
3 Amit Saad has once made similar claims to the ones I make here [4, pp. 457-459].
4 10, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000,
000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000
5 Magidor bases this first rebuttal of Dummett on Wright [8].
6 A philosopher who does endorse a solution close to this is Timothy Williamson.
He claims that every vague predicate has some hard border, even if we do not
know what this border is. Magidor is aware of this position, but does not want
to use it as a premise ([2, p. 405] and [3, p. 472]). With good reason, since his
theory is not uncontroversial enough to unproblematically invoke as a premise.
Thus, we should appreciate Magidor’s attempt to find a hard border for its own
merits, without relying on Williamson’s theory. For Williamson’s account, see
[7].
7 The following proof has been taken from Magidor [2, p. 409].
8 Magidor also argues that adopting a cut-free logic would help strict finitism
resist certain versions of Dummett’s argument [3, pp. 484-486]. However, I do
not discuss cut-free logic in this paper for reasons of scope.
9 Some hope for Dummett comes from Jean Paul van Bendegem. He suggests that
rather than looking for a border between apodictic and non-apodictic numbers,
we should imagine a grey area of numbers for which it is unclear whether they
are apodictic. If this grey area can be made small enough, Dummett might be
able to find concrete numbers for m and k [6].
10 Unsurprisingly, not all agree. One example of a philosopher who is enamoured
by strict finitism, despite its flaws, is Jean Paul van Bendegem [5].
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